Summary 3. Gefahrenbericht
General
This “Third Risk Report” as presented by the Advisory Board for Civil Protection on 26 March 2006 to the German Interior Minister gives an assessment of both the broad spectrum of imminent threats facing Germany and the provisions needed to meet them. In this report, expert consideration of possible future events is investigated, a distinction between ABC and other types of risks is made, and a systematic assessment of existing gaps, or deficiencies, in emergency preparedness and response is carried out. In addition, rationale for the derived priorities is given and a prognosis for the future is suggested. The fact that the Advisory Board’s working conditions have, in many ways, fallen off is openly tackled. Future work of the Advisory Board will be addressed in a separate chapter.
As with the first two “Risk Reports”, the conception and development of this third “Risk Report” was made upon the initiative of the Advisory Board for Civil Protection to the German Interior Minister. It should be emphasised here that – for over 50 years – the Advisory Board has been free to co-opt its members and guests and elect its chairmen from relevant fields of science. The Advisory Board gratefully acknowledges the suggestions and support received from the Federal Ministry of the Interior (BMI), the Federal Office for Civil Protection and Disaster Response (BBK), and the Conference of State Interior Ministers and Senators (IMK).
Scope
The scope of this “Risk Report” should be noted, namely: this report is neither a compendium of all current threats to Germany nor does it provide a comprehensive summary of all origins or originators of such hazards and threats.
The report, for example, does not provide an analysis of terrorist movements – the Federal Criminal Police (BKA) is in a much better position to perform such an analysis. However, the report emphatically warns against the common misapprehension that the fight against terrorism is a “war”. Rather it is a very unique type of political conflict, fought on different levels: the political level, which seeks to offer would-be terrorists another way of life; the economic level, which seeks to disrupt and bankrupt companies and enterprises run for and/or by terrorist organisations; the civil safety level, which draws upon law enforcement to fight terrorism; and the legal level, which punishes acts of terrorism.
The “Third Risk Report” is the result of the close co-operation between scientists of several disciplines (natural, medical and social sciences) and represents their views at this point in time (2006). The report focuses on actual imminent threats – both – incursive and furtive. On several occasions, recommendations given in previous reports are cross-referenced. Pointing out these different types is not just whistle blowing – we mean what we say.
Types of hazards
The types of hazards included in the report are:
A: Nuclear (Atomic) hazards
B: Biological hazards
C: Chemical hazards
D: Hazards to the communication systems and Data flow
E: Hazards caused by Elecromagnetic puls,
F: Hazards resulting from the release (freeing) of kinetic and thermal energy
These hazards can be characterised in the following way:
A. Nuclear hazardsinclude nuclear warfare, terrorism and extortion as well as relevant threats resulting from negligence or the inherent risk of industrial (peaceful) uses of ionising radiation and radioactive substances together with the general oversight and safety of its land waste.
B. Biological hazards (e.g. prions, viruses, rickettsia, bacteria and fungi) include biological warfare, unplanned and unintentional releases and dissemination of highly virulent and infectious diseases caused by declining inoculation habits, by increased mobility or by the deliberate distribution of biological agents by terrorists.
C. Chemical hazards include chemical warfare (organophosphates, carbamates), the use of toxic chemicals for means of terrorism and extortion as well as hazards resulting from the industrial production of chemicals and their by-products, their use, transport and disposal (peacetime).
D. Threats to the communication systems and data flow include the intentional attack on and disruption of both data centres and communication networks as a result of war, terrorism or racketeering. Viruses or hackers, for example, can interrupt the data flow or distort data. One possible consequence of such disruption could be the failure of critical infrastructures, resulting in shortages in energy, water, and food supplies. The strategic shutdown of satellite operations and other information providers must also be considered.
E. Electromagnetic pulse (EMP) can be used as a weapon in times of war and as “electromagnetic terrorism”. EMP can interfere with or destroy all types of electronic devices (from airplanes to pacemakers) and jeopardise operation of key infrastructures (radio, rescue services, hospitals, power supplies and transportation systems). Shutting down the emergency alert system would impede helping the wounded or ill and obstruct evacuations.
F. Hazards resulting from the release (freeing) of kinetic and thermal energy can occur during warfare, as an act of terrorism, or accidentally (peacetime). Such events can involve accidents on trains, ships, in the air or in a tunnel, the destruction of transmission lines and pipelines, collapsing buildings, explosions, accidents at waste disposal sites, or scrap material falling from outer space. Each one of these disasters would have the potential of igniting wildfires. Additional scenarios include flooding, torrential rains, ice drifts, embankment failures, snowfall, hurricanes, avalanches, landslides and mudslides, forest fires, earthquakes, and volcanoes. Such scenarios can occur naturally or as a result of the intentional use of bombs or explosives.
Gaps
The six most imperative gaps, or deficiencies, are
1. Mobilising the public’s ability to help themselves;
2. Protecting critical infrastructures;
3. Alerting and, subsequently, notifying the public, aid organisations and emergency response;
4. Providing victims with medical, pharmaceutical, and psychosocial support and aftercare;
5. Organising emergency management, in general; and
6. Supplying food and drinking water.
In 2006, the Advisory Board for Civil Protection to the German Interior Minister developed ideas and recommendations for improving the current situation. One important aspect to remember is that the complex network and inter-dependability of the global economy represents an implicit threat, which should not be taken lightly. Even comparatively trivial attacks can have a major impact. One striking example took place in December 2005. Power failures in the US, Sweden, Italy, Luxembourg and Germany (Westphalia) – each caused by comparatively minor technical problems – resulted in economic loss and their ramifications to other infrastructures, i.e. traffic, banking and industry, far exceeded the actual technical problem (in Italy, for example, long distance power lines were broken because a tree was too tall in Switzerland). The fragile complexity of our civilisation as it is today cannot be reduced sufficiently to prevent such difficulties However, identifying and protecting critical elements and increasing reserve capacity can improve the intrinsic security of cross-linked, critical systems.
(1) As in the past, the Advisory Board notes that there is a motivational gap that hinders “Mobilising the public’s ability to help themselves”. State-aided actions cannot improve the current situation if not accepted by the public. Declining civic involvement is a structural problem of our society but it can be solved if there is a continuous dialogue with all stakeholders. Such dialogue should include all aspects related to increasing the motivation of private households to more readily engage in necessary precautions, including keeping a stock of supplies. The public urgently needs to be informed of possible threats and how to cope with them while, at the same time, developing a positive public attitude towards these issues.
(2) “Protecting critical infrastructures” includes protecting the energy supply, chemical plants, electronic communication systems, the water supply, public buildings, transportation systems, supply of resources, as well as the financial system. These critical infrastructures are essential for society to exist. A total or partial disruption or failure of these structures would have a major and far-reaching impact on individuals or society as a whole, e.g. shortage of primary products and the energy supply, refugee problems and economic loss. In states of extreme emergency, there will be a general disregard for the law, leading – for example – to vandalism and looting, which could in turn result in severe infrastructure problems. Preventive measures are needed to avoid such consequences, which in the long term, could result in the tragic loss of highly valued cultural objects (works of art, libraries, national monuments, etc.).
(3) The lack of a generally accepted concept with robust reserve capacities as well as the technical means to warn and communicate continues to be an essential problem in “Alerting and, subsequently, notifying the public, aid organisations and emergency response”. “Alerting” means waking people up and informing them.
TV and radio stations are certainly modules to be used in such a concept but they do not cover all aspects of alerting the public. Questions that have not yet been answered to full satisfaction address the secure communication of emergency response units. Deficits of this kind can result in limitations to the efficiency of these organisations. The underlying technical problems are solved – financing problems remain. Action is urgently needed to solve the problem.
(4) Ongoing deficits in “Providing victims with medical, pharmaceutical and psychosocial support and aftercare” include: (1) implementing a generally accepted concept that includes the potential and capabilities of all available resources for protecting and rescuing life, maintaining health and recovery from the health effects caused by a major accident; (2) developing and implementing a long-term strategy for both educating and training medical doctors and quality assurance of organisations offering psychosocial support and after-care for victims; (3) establishing and maintaining special units for detecting and assessing certain hazards; and (4) maintaining specific stock, e.g. pharmaceuticals.
(5) The establishment of the Common Management and Information Centre (GLMZ) is considered a major step forward in “Organising emergency management, in general”. Further steps are needed to achieve a sustainable improvement of the national emergency response system. Of particular importance is finding a means to permanently strengthen co-ordination tasks at the federal level, e.g. a constitutional mandate for the Federal Ministry of the Interior.
(6) Strengthening co-ordination actions at the federal level is very important for “Supplying food and drinking water”. There seems to be a major discrepancy between the risk of supply systems breaking down and the ability of competent organisations at the state and federal levels to formulate plans that would make such breakdowns avoidable – in particular in the agricultural field. Self-protection and keeping an inventory of stock are usually not taken seriously. Should there be a shortage of supplies, it is willingly acknowledged that there will also be a black market filling in the gap.
The idea of avoiding any emergency or danger is Utopian at best. The state has a mandate to mitigate the consequences of an emergency. If properly planned and carried out, it will legitimatise the states safety policy and, in case of a large-scale disaster, the public will more readily accept that there are limitations to the political leadership’s ability to organise emergency preparedness (ultra posse nemo obligatur – no one is obligated beyond what he is able to do). However, the public will never accept clear failures concerning emergency preparedness.
This report provides quite a number of additional recommendations aimed at closing gaps and includes proposals for related research.
Foundation of priorities and prognoses
This “Third Risk Report” is based on the assumption that risks can change in a highly volatile fashion, which, in turn, may lead to rapid changes in priorities associated with individual risks. Bearing this in mind, the Advisory Board organised a Delphi survey in which three different time horizontals for the occurrence of major hazards were used; i.e. now and during the next ten years (up to 2016). Details are described in Section 2 of this report.
The situation as it is right now: The following ranking is based on the number of nominations received:
1 Chemical and biological hazards were ranked almost equally at the top. In the case of chemical hazards, emphasis is put on accidents during peace-time as well as on the simplicity to produce chemical substances for criminal applications;
2 German society is not well prepared to cope with emergency situations. This influences not only their individual preparedness but also their ability to understand public-sector protective measures. As a consequence, the political, economic, and social dimension may have an important impact on the safety situation;
3 More hazards resulting from the release of kinetic and thermal energy (terrorist explosives, traffic accidents, destruction of infrastructure);
4 Nuclear hazards; and
5 An increase of organised criminal activity (arms trade, proliferation of hazardous material) is expected.
The situation to 2016: The Advisory Board was more cautious in assessing the future situation, where the following hazards became more dominant:
1 Chemical hazards (chronic intoxication) and biological hazards (epidemics und pandemics, zoonoses, and new pathogens resistant to treatment) ranked first;
2 Assuming continuous peacetime, general health problems (resistance to antibiotics, for example, shortages in supplies and medical staff) would be ranked second;
3 Hazards relating to organised crime (illegal trade of weapons and humans);
4 Hazards resulting from the release of kinetic and thermal energy, which could be related to climate change;
5 Nuclear hazards, which might be related to energy shortages; and
6 Natural and environmental problems as well as water shortages, which is thought will increase with time.
Perspective
As a scientific commission, the Advisory Board for Civil Protection to the German Interior Minister has the duty to clearly underscore here that much more dedicated basic and applied research is required in order to close major existing gaps in the understanding of risks to society and to improve the foundation and rationale of emergency preparedness and response.